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1. CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCE MECHANISMS: NEW 
FRONTIERS FOR FAMILIAR TOOLS 
In the framing article of this Special Issue, Colgan (2016) has argued, as others 
have in recent work (Wagner and Weitzman, 2015; Stern, 2015) that funding 
adaptive responses to climate impacts presents special, if not unique, economic 
challenges and demands. These include perverse capital valuations in which 
negative interest rates imply limitless ceilings on expenditures, problematic 
intertemporal cost and benefit transfers across generations, and rampant 
uncertainty. Nonetheless, local and state governments collectively face daily 
investment and construction decisions about sustaining infrastructure and 
managing the built environment that will have a decades-long effect. These 
decisions both affect and will be affected by future conditions, but we must address 
how to pay for them today. Hence, regardless of whether vexing aspects of climate 
adaptation have been recognized, let alone coped with, the decisions about it are 
already in play.  
2. SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE 
The purpose of this article is to ground the complexities of adaptation finance for 
public infrastructure and risk management in a discussion of the tools and strategies 
available to pay for it, largely as it affects the local government level in the U.S., 
where much investment and construction must take place. There are emerging 
lessons about how to use such mechanisms and how to approach such decisions. 
Existing tools used in new applications and combinations present useful 
opportunities.  
Although not a theoretical discussion, we address several relevant principles—
mainly the rational nexus test of who benefits and who pays—that strongly 
influence public acceptability of such funding schemes. Colgan (2016) uses a 
variant of the well-known public goods definition matrix to identify possible 
finance mechanisms by who benefits and who pays, following the logic of what is 
a public versus private good or service. The discussion and examples herein will 
show that those boundaries are not only quite permeable but that successful 
development of adaptation finance mechanisms will often require careful 
navigation of mixed public and private goods and burdens to achieve needed 
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results. Although mixed goods and services are a well-known phenomenon in 
economics, hybridizing such goods and services means paying for them is not likely 
to be a defect, but rather a virtue, in adaptation. Examples here come from civil 
infrastructure, particularly stormwater management. Adaptation takes many forms 
and must address both coastal and inland hazards including those from water and 
weather, heat, disease and impacts on safety, public health, and all aspects of the 
economy. We will focus on water and weather-borne hazards and the adaptation of 
the human-settled environment to manage growing impacts. The financing 
strategies at local and state scales discussed here can apply across the landscape, 
especially when not limiting the sources of funds to limited federal programs, which 
is exactly the point here. Some examples of innovative financing are also drawn 
from the energy conversion arena (e.g. adding solar electric capacity locally), but 
that is not the focus. 
The growing and still recent local government experience with stormwater 
management funding is an opportunity to learn about aspects of adaptation finance 
necessary to effectively utilize money streams that will come from multiple sources 
including new bond market utilizations, which will be discussed in part, as well as 
local tax and fee revenues. Finally, the focus is on the United States situation in the 
necessary context of its institutions and the boundaries of action those entail. Other 
nations’ situations must be considered on their own terms. 
3. THE U.S. INFRASTRUCTURE CLIMATE FUNDING DILEMMA 
It is no revelation that aging infrastructure in the United States already presents a 
financing challenge that has yet to elicit a comprehensive framework for response 
at any level of government. By many estimates the entire potable water supply 
system will need to be replaced over the next few decades—a problem highlighted 
for the public by the 2016 lead emergency in the water system of Flint, Michigan. 
More systematically the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 2013 Report 
Card on America’s Infrastructure gave the nation’s physical plant a grade of D+, 
with $3.6 trillion in overall infrastructure needs by 2020 of which $633 billion is 
for water and wastewater systems and another $150 billion potentially for new 
stormwater demands, (ASCE, 2013).  
3.1 The Limits of Federal Financing 
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognizes stormwater as the 
nation’s most significant water pollution control challenge because of urbanization 
and increasing impacts of the changing climate (Milly et al., 2008). Where sea level 
rise (SLR) and larger future storms are added factors, coastal communities and 
landscapes face even greater impacts, such as the unexpected $65 billion worth of 
damage caused by Hurricane Sandy in the New York City region in 2012. Thus 
U.S. localities are faced with large needs to maintain, replace and further adapt 
fixed water and wastewater treatment facilities and to manage the distributed, 
multi-actor stormwater problem for both public and private property, which is 
growing. To illustrate the shortfall in meeting this need, Canada is spending 10 
times more money per capita on stormwater at mid-decade than the United States. 
Thus, a very modest estimate of what the U.S. should be spending at present would 
boost the current $8 billion U.S. annual expenditure to $80 billion as a comparable 
proportion of GDP. 
Limited federal funds fall far short of these needs. A principal federal vehicle 
for funding domestic water infrastructure, the State Revolving Funds (SRFs) 
created under the Clean Water Act, have provided an important tool for states and 
their localities to primarily address wastewater and water supply facility needs. 
SRFs provide low-interest loans for investments in water and wastewater 
infrastructure and have recently begun to slowly add funds for nonpoint source 
pollution control (stormwater). An SRF receives its initial capital from federal 
grants and state appropriation contributions then issues bonds guaranteed by this 
capital. It then "revolves" via repayment of principal and payment of interest on 
outstanding loans. The SRFs lack funds to meet known needs and this “gap” has 
recently been addressed by Congress with the passage of Title V of the Water 
Resources Reform and Development Act (WRRDA) of 2013, which provides an 
additional source of funds for large (i.e. $20 million or greater) facility projects 
primarily for water supply and wastewater fixed facility needs but not for 
stormwater management. The approach leverages federal funds by providing new 
low-interest underwriting of loans for such projects, and can supplement SRF 
projects.  
This new program is still being deployed and it is unknown if it can bridge the 
funding gap for primary water supply and wastewater facilities alone. As of this 
writing it was still not in full operation. Managing stormwater is also vulnerable to 
climate change and has only slightly been addressed with SRF funds. The US EPA 
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has begun vigorously promoting public-private partnerships (known as P3s) to 
address water infrastructure needs, primarily in terms of operating agreements and 
newer design-build-operate projects involving private firms. In a P3, providers 
responsible for public water supply and sanitation systems can be owned, financed, 
operated and maintained by either a public entity, a private company, or both, and 
can share these responsibilities through public-private partnerships. As the rest of 
this article argues, this is not the only mechanism to tap more funds for addressing 
adaptation needs that are dispersed and highly influenced by climate change, such 
as stormwater.  
3.2 Public Private Partnerships as Remedy to Federal Shortfalls 
Public-private partnerships, in which the government contracts private entities to 
perform different functions, have garnered a great deal of federal attention. Such 
contracts have long been part and parcel of construction projects, including that of 
the Pentagon in 1942. The Miller Act of 1935 reformed federal use of private 
contractors by requiring performance bonds to protect the public. Modern public-
private can be used to finance, build and operate projects, such as public 
transportation, wastewater facilities, parks and convention centers by providing 
private capital especially where timely public funds are unavailable (e.g. due to 
indebtedness levels). The private entity can also operate a service under such 
agreements, which typically have a functional lifetime of 20 to 30 years. The 
contractor earns operating revenue by a “concession,” either through payments 
from the public entity or direct service charges to the users. A variety of Internal 
Revenue Service and Securities and Exchange Commission regulations determine 
how these agreements can be configured. 
These arrangements have mainly involved physical public facilities. A 
celebrated (among specialized circles) and recent innovation has been the 30-year, 
$100 million agreement between Prince George’s County, Maryland and the 
private firm Corvias Solutions of the Corvias Group, Inc. to fully operate this 
rapidly growing, heavily urbanized county’s stormwater management program as 
an enterprise (Corvias Group, 2014). Other major urban counties in the Chesapeake 
Bay watershed are likely to follow suit (University of Maryland Environmental 
Finance Center 2016—hereafter UMD EFC). In such arrangements, the 
government entity pays the operator for this service. Like a growing number of 
localities, the county has instituted a stormwater utility fee—a money-raising 
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mechanism to be discussed below and elsewhere in this article as an example of a 
conventional tool (user fees and surcharges) extended to new problems and 
situations (dispersed stormwater management rather than a facility usage fee like a 
water supply or a park). 
The significance of stormwater utilities is that, rather than charging users for a 
metered service (such as a water supply, toll road or entrance to a sports facility), 
this arrangement involves a broad system that is both a private and public good. 
Such fees are based on measures of each property’s contribution to storm runoff, 
but also contribute to a systemic level of management of the environment, which, 
as it has non-excludable benefits, cannot be considered private goods. This 
represents an innovation in that stormwater utilities, as we will argue in the 
following sections, represent an expansion of existing public fiscal latitude and 
options for funding environmental services. 
4. PROPOSED AND DEVELOPING FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS 
Whether coastal or inland, the local and state levels are the necessary context to 
examine emerging tools to pay for adaptive action to respond to climate impacts. 
Though existing tools provide many opportunities for novel deployment to fund 
adaptation, there are also needs for institutional innovation at both state and federal 
levels to facilitate leveraging and combining funds in new ways—for example 
through more such arrangements as that in Prince George’s County. There is also 
growing high-level interest in market-based funding mechanisms including trading 
schemes and catastrophe, resiliency and green bonds. Nonetheless, in further 
discussing those new schemes here and in later sections, it is also important to 
recognize how the local project scale remains a critical element in utilizing any 
such funds and how existing tools represent innovations when configured for new 
purposes.  
Stormwater control funding and management schemes as an area of everyday 
innovation have become a major applied industry as well as a key local government 
function. It is a prosaic arena that perhaps has not received the attention deserved 
in adaptation economics. Complex and still sparsely implemented mechanisms—
trading markets and new bond products—do not tell the whole story of how local 
governments are pursuing approaches that may integrate public and private 
resources in projects and programs. This trend might be further represented here by 
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Figure 1, an alternative to the classification of finance mechanisms strictly in terms 
of who pays and who benefits, because those boundaries are permeable and 
dynamic. 
 
Figure 1. Desirable dynamics in public-private resilience finance 
Here the role of public investments and organization is to leverage and facilitate 
private participation as well, and innovation that creates multiple co-benefits which 
allows for the leveraging. Each of these finance arenas—new bond products, 
market trading schemes and lessons from stormwater finance—will be discussed as 
well as some of the institutional demands involved. 
4.1 Catastrophe and Resilience Bonds 
In the face of federal resource limits, both tapping private resources more 
effectively and the pursuit of more effective project approaches are growing 
directions for local financing strategies. Catastrophe bonds have thus received new 
attention as one means to raise private funds for post-disaster recovery in an 
innovative manner. The Rockefeller Foundation-funded re:focus Partners group 
has proposed a framework for better promoting such catastrophe-bond-like 
investments and possibly to tie variable investment returns to risk reduction 
resulting from the local use of the bond funds (re:focus Partners, 2015a).  
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The catastrophe bond as insurance strategy does not, however, address the need 
for proactive investment to transition to resilient infrastructure in the first place. 
Resilience bonds, another new bond product receiving attention in specialized 
circles, are a potential means to fund such action. Green bonds, a term for the type 
of social and economic benefits to be funded, have emerged to be applied largely 
to energy efficiency and renewable energy projects with readily identifiable 
benefits over time. There are lessons about the use of such bonds for distributed 
(i.e., multiple household or business sector) energy conversion projects that are 
useful to consider and are discussed later in this section. But resilience bonding for 
long-term hazard reduction actions will require more challenging specification and 
monetization of benefits of avoided costs or damages. Moreover, pre-emptive 
adaptation is still an immediate local responsibility. That is the level where benefits 
are created and thus become trans-actable through the inventive design of the 
projects to be funded.  
The frontier for true resiliency bonds may be “assetizing” risk-reducing 
adaptation actions. For example, investors would provide funds for such actions 
within a defined area such as a city or county or regional feature like an area of 
coastline. The resiliency-bond-as-insurance concept being promoted by the 
re:focus Partners LLC REBOUND project is a step towards this as shown on the 
following page in their Figure 2 (re:focus Partners LLC, 2015a). As bond funds are 
used to make investments that reduce risk, the insured local government entity 
would receive a rebate which is a reduction in the bond repayment based on the 
presumed better-protected capital investment by the bond buyers (i.e., a lesser 
chance of triggering the damage loss level that requires paying out capital to the 
insured).  
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Figure 2. Resilience bond concept (re:focus Partners, 2015a) 
However, this value capture scheme for adaptive risk reduction is currently only 
a prototype and would have to be implemented at a scale large enough to create a 
market. Localities may need to incrementally improve risk reduction until the 
conventional bond market responds with preferential rates for further infrastructure 
investment. Nonetheless, for more than 50 years the natural hazards community has 
barely achieved necessary progress in risk reduction (See Mileti, 1999). 
State infrastructure banks can play a larger role in public adaptation finance. 
They are an essential conduit for local project funding and are being extended in 
new ways via local project and program design to climate-relevant adaptation and 
to private actors. But the institutional configurations vary from state to state and 
larger industrial states have more to offer. For example, in Pennsylvania the state’s 
2013 General Assembly session innovatively expanded the authority of 
PENNVEST—the Pennsylvania Infrastructure Investment Authority—to include 
stormwater and nonpoint pollution projects, including private as well as public 
borrowers. PENNVEST has also underwritten some of the construction of 
Lancaster’s green infrastructure projects discussed in a later section.  
The terrain of state infrastructure loan and bond underwriting agencies is 
complex: for example, the Pennsylvania Infrastructure Bank (PIB) and 
PENNVEST are two different authorities, the former of which deals with funding 
for all modes of transportation works (road, rail, air, sea) in the state. Explaining 
the institutional landscape nationwide is beyond the scope of this article. State 
underwriting authorities will play a major role in any effective solutions to funding 
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climate adaptation at the local level and in utilizing private capital markets, but 
alignment with those purposes must be developed on a state by state basis. 
The energy conversion arena provides a useful example of how the existing 
bond market, together with local fiscal revenue tools, can propel innovation in local 
adaptation. These efforts contribute to the arena of climate change mitigation 
(greenhouse gas reduction), which aims to achieve de-carbonization. Attention 
should be paid to the translatable lessons from one use of such fiscal mechanisms 
to other arenas, e.g. from the local-scale energy conversion setting to other local 
adaptation project situations.   
Energy projects for de-carbonization at both large (e.g., power utility) and 
smaller (household or business property) scales have financing advantages that 
hazard reduction does not. For example, the creation of energy efficiency savings 
and actual power generation are goods for which there is indeed a market. City and 
statewide adoption of official goals for climate mitigation has led to financing 
programs to spur distributed household and business installation of solar electric 
panels.  
In 2007, the city of Berkeley, CA created a citywide Sustainable Energy 
Financing District to enable use of a pilot-scale revenue bond to provide funding to 
residential and commercial building owners to install solar electric systems. The 
upfront costs of solar conversion can be prohibitive for individual owners but 
through this approach the bond funds are repaid through an additional property tax 
increment over 20 years, like a mortgage. Palm Springs, CA soon followed suit 
with this model that Berkeley named FIRST—Financing Initiative for Renewable 
and Solar Technology. Nonetheless, Berkeley’s program faced federal challenges 
regarding bond management.  
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) questioned the acceptability of 
the bond provisions and borrower qualifying procedures involved in Berkeley’s 
agreement with their bond purchaser, a small venture firm called Renewable 
Financing, created by a former Berkeley mayor’s office staff member who was one 
of the champions of the concept. Among the issues was the incompatibility of the 
lender’s requirements for lien superiority (first call on borrower defaults) with the 
expectations of the underwriters of most home mortgage loans—Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae (Lord, 2010). Berkeley’s pioneering program eventually disbursed its 
small initial bond fund to local property owners and went fallow for a time. Climate 
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Solutions, an organization promoting energy conversion, has argued that this is one 
of the prime examples of how “… local government has a critical role to play in 
climate leadership galvanizing stakeholders, bringing focus to zones, and 
leveraging public financing” as well as creating financial innovation (Tucker 2009). 
Berkeley’s experiment has served as a model for state-managed Property 
Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs in 21 states. These programs continue to 
evolve as individual states take action. For example, at this writing the proposed 
commercial and residential PACE programs in Connecticut are expected to provide 
access to private financing, with, significantly, a senior lien for qualifying 
resiliency investments—including hurricane and flood-proofing—that can be 
repaid via a benefit assessment on the owner’s property tax (French et al., in press).  
The supply of such green bonds worldwide grew by twenty percent between 
2014-2015, but an International Energy Agency 2014 analysis estimated that $53 
trillion U.S. are needed globally to meet greenhouse gas mitigation targets adopted 
by signatory nations. While adaptation funding is a different matter, this gives an 
idea of the scale of capital needs for dealing with the future. The director of the 
nonprofit Clean Bond Initiative (CBI) noted that while investment banks and other 
international investors are raising funds for energy investing, “they just can’t find 
places to put their money.” At the same time, CBI has also complained that “the 
U.S. corporate market is a big market, so the fact that it’s not playing its part is 
worrying for us all” (Douglass 2015). Thus, bonds as a financing solution will 
require attractive and viable projects and programs to be conceived to mobilize 
capital markets sufficiently, an interactive race that has hardly begun for adaptation. 
4.2 Trading Market Schemes 
There is also growing interest in market-based strategies such as trading schemes. 
While much debate surrounds national-market strategies such as carbon trading, 
which could influence large scale energy supply, product design, manufacturing 
and other major systems if fully implemented, localized market strategies for 
nutrient reduction credits for pollution control have begun to emerge in a few places 
with the most extreme needs and capacity to innovate, such as the states and 
localities of Chesapeake Bay, at the local government and watershed scales 
(Chesapeake Bay Program, 2016). Nutrient trading is a new mechanism and 
requires a framework to establish a marketplace for transactions, again with a role 
for state government to reach scale. A recent Chesapeake Bay Forum on 
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Environmental Finance conducted by the EPA Region 3 Environmental Finance 
Center at the University of Maryland reported that:1 
While Maryland’s Nutrient Credit Trading Program has not yet seen 
much trading activity, its web-based Marketplace and Trading 
Registry is a good model of well-conceived market infrastructure. 
The portal includes a tool for estimating credits generated by BMPs, 
and it serves as a central place for buyers and sellers to make 
transactions (UMD EFC 2016:17). 
Such pollution trading is driven and defined by pollution control requirements 
of the Clean Water Act (e.g. TMDL limits—Total Maximum Daily Loads of 
specified pollutants such as nitrogen and phosphorous). This has tended to emerge 
so far only where there is a well-defined resource—for example Chesapeake Bay—
in which many actors including local governments and property owners all play a 
role in creating impacts.  
Trading schemes to engage in adaptive and proactive risk reduction for 
infrastructure and communities present greater challenges in terms of defining 
benefits and how to distribute those benefits to the receiving traders in relation to 
the costs of actions assumed by the sending traders. For example, why should some 
property owners choose to buy credits from other property owners who have raised 
a road to avoid storm surges? There is not a clearly tradable benefit in and of itself 
by which the former can utilize the value in avoided proximate area damages of the 
latter’s action. Yet there is a demonstrable need to raise, harden or move many such 
roads across coastlines to adapt to sea level rise and storm surge impacts. There is 
a community benefit to risk reduction even beyond that which benefits the property 
location, but it is dispersed as an externality beyond the transaction. Trading 
schemes at all levels remain controversial in that there is an implicit if not explicit 
                                                          
1 The Environmental Finance Centers (EFCs) are a nationwide network of university-based 
teams sponsored by USEPA in its 10 regions since the 1990s to address the question of 
“how to pay” for environmental improvements. Following the heightened need for 
innovation, the EFCs in EPA Region 4 (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) and 
Region 3 (University of Maryland) have held recent expert regional forums on emerging 
trends in environmental finance, in 2014 and 2016 respectively (UNC EFC 2014; UMD 
EFC 2016). Both forums, attended by public and private leaders representing all three 
levels of government, utilities, and the finance sector, focus on the need for and conditions 
that will foster greater private engagement in environmental resilience projects. 
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acceptance of some level of pollution, for example. That has been the basis of 
lawsuits by environmental activists protecting the State of Maryland’s nutrient 
trading scheme for Chesapeake Bay, although it was unsuccessful (Wheeler, 2013). 
The same questions will arise even more so in trading schemes for adaptive risk 
reduction: how much risk is acceptable and what are the implications of the variable 
distribution of exposure within the trading area? 
Credit rather than trading schemes have so far been based on regulatory 
mandates which force the externality back into the picture in a manner to be 
explained here. There are some systems called “credits” like the Lake Tahoe Lake 
Clarity Credit Program (Lahontan Regional Water Quality Control Board, 2011), 
in which the term “credit” simply refers to a technical metric of how much each 
nonpoint (nutrient and runoff) pollution control measure is likely to contribute to 
meeting the required TMDL benchmark. This should not be confused with credits 
that have a monetized transfer value in terms of off-setting a fee, as with stormwater 
utility credit systems. Many questions remain about how trading schemes can work 
to enable distributed (many-site) private investment in adaptive risk reduction. The 
experience with stormwater fees and credits provides some potential insights. 
4.3 Stormwater Utilities, Credit Systems and Adaptive Action 
Credit systems are already playing a substantive role in the stormwater management 
arena and being translated into adaptive investments by ratepayers. Stormwater 
utility fees have set an important precedent for expanding the legitimacy of public 
service charges to a generalized, systemic environmental impact—too much water, 
too little of it controlled. It is important to note that the mechanism has often met 
with public resistance, being called a “rain tax” as a term of political derision 
implying that the government outrageously wants to charge for a natural process. 
Yet nothing could better characterize likely funding disputes on the even greater 
challenge of climate adaptation. 
Stormwater utilities provide an opportunity to go beyond simply raising capital 
and operating funds to spurring the engagement of private parties in adaptation 
actions in new ways through the offering of credits that offset fees. For a 
homeowner, that may mean decoupling from street sewers and capturing runoff in 
a lawn area that has been modified to allow water to percolate into the soil or have 
slow release after storms. For a commercial or industrial structure, it may mean 
modifying parking lots or creating artificial wetlands or green roofs. Such practices 
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(often bundled under the terms green infrastructure or low impact development) are 
not entirely new but must emerge at a very wide scale from many smaller actions 
to create significant resilience. These efforts go beyond the “Minimum Control 
Measures” for stormwater required by existing regulation of states and localities 
under Phase 2 of the Clean Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES Phase 2) since 1996. But a growing number of communities are 
pursuing such systemic efforts because the increases in stormwater runoff in some 
regions due to climate change are causing problems with performance of other 
Clean Water Act-required pollution control infrastructure (e.g., central wastewater 
treatment) as well as more flooding. Multi-actor private investment and innovation 
(use of new green infrastructure on properties) that reduces impacts and adapts to 
emerging environmental conditions is as much needed for adaptation as are larger-
scale public infrastructure investments.  
The following credit illustration is drawn from the City of Richmond, Virginia’s 
stormwater utility (another Chesapeake Bay community) using a residential single-
family-homeowner’s case. Other details apply to multi-family and commercial 
ratepayers but it is not the intent here to review all such details (City of Richmond, 
2013). A homeowner could receive a maximum of a fifty percent fee reduction for 
installation of a combination of on-site runoff storage, on-site infiltration or other 
measures that keep excess water from entering and stressing city storm sewerage 
and waste treatment systems or contribute to flooding. Storage control of the entire 
housing unit’s roof through rain barrels and creating infiltration for the driveways 
with permeable pavement could earn that half-fee reduction level in Richmond. 
This system converts part of a transfer payment (the fee) into private investment in 
actions that have co-benefits on several levels: property improvement, a 
contribution to risk reduction over time, resiliency and a lessening of the expensive 
load on public water infrastructure are only some of those mixed benefits.  
There are also possible pecuniary benefits to the property owner from such 
“green infrastructure” (GI) improvements. For example, the earliest adopters of 
such efforts such as Seattle and other Washington State localities and the Toronto 
metropolitan region have found that GI investments add value to real property 
(Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 2003). With increasing and expensive water-
driven impacts on a variety of local infrastructure from a changing climate—
transportation and critical facilities as well as primary waste treatment plants—
local governments are going beyond minimum regulatory requirements to engage 
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the private sector in adaptation at the basic level of home and business properties 
as this will help reduce combined sewer overflows that impact large, expensive 
central systems and reduce some levels of flooding. 
For example, the Lancaster, PA fee-and-credit system in its first two years 
(2013-2015) received 47 private property owner applications for credits for green 
infrastructure private investments, of which over 40 were approved for the 
exchange. The city has also assisted owners with tapping construction funding from 
the state’s infrastructure bank, PENNVEST (Katzenmoyer, 2015). Lancaster’s 
adopted strategy intends to cover 25 years of progressive stormwater actions, so 
these credits and resulting private improvements are just a beginning. 
Stormwater utilities as enabled by each state’s legislation are a matter of local 
choice. Thus, the option to develop expanded local funding systems that provide 
credit systems for proportional exchange of private investments that increase 
resilience is demonstrated by these growing local practices. Whether local 
governments and state enablers choose to widen such practices to risk reduction, 
for example, has yet to be seen. Some of the factors that will influence this 
development are discussed in following sections. 
5. PRINCIPLES SUPPORTING THE NEW FINANCE 
Figure 1 suggests that we see adaptation finance strategies and tools not as strictly 
public goods-private goods categories, but as a dynamic process. The principles in 
Figure 1 describe practical design characteristics of financing mechanisms in terms 
of three ideas: combing private and public investment where possible; promoting 
distributed innovation by private actors through multiple means; and supporting 
both aims by designing uses of resources that aim for co-benefits. A fourth 
principle—not new to anyone involved in the struggle for more flood and storm 
hazard mitigation that long pre-dates concern with climate change—is to pursue 
finance mechanisms that move from post-impact disaster recovery funding to 
proactive risk reduction and increased resilience. 
One of the vital and at times hard-won lessons in winning public approval for 
the new stormwater utility fees just discussed has been the need to engage the 
public, from the earliest phases of the effort to create the new financing mechanism, 
in learning how better management will benefit the community (Office of Policy, 
USEPA 2013). Acceptance must also be gained for the specific means of funding. 
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To be acceptable, emerging approaches must confront and satisfy the long-
standing boundaries placed on American public finance. These are grounded in the 
utilitarian foundations of the U.S. economic-legal system and are the basis for 
public finance theory and actual everyday practice. Local governments have two 
major categories of revenue-raising mechanisms for public purposes. First are 
general revenue sources in the form of various taxes, especially those on real 
property for local government actions. Nonetheless, in some states local 
governments share sales tax revenues directly or indirectly with their states and in 
a few states, larger localities may impose income taxes.  
Traditional local property tax revenues for public goods and services must 
comply with the constitutional requirement for equal protection and the utilitarian 
principle of tax benefit equity (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1973). This allows for 
compulsory taxation to raise a general fund without a specific inventory of 
everyone’s consumption of those goods and services. An important modification to 
the real property tax mechanism has been the specific enabling by many state 
legislatures of tax increment financing (TIF) districts in which revenue from the 
new real estate tax base in a defined area can be sequestered for public 
improvements that benefit the public but may be used to enable specific 
development projects. This is but one example of how the tax benefit equity dictum 
has been loosened, how new value is leveraged and how public and private benefits 
are mixed. 
The second major revenue category includes fees or service charges for public 
goods and services, such as water supply and sewer utilities. But many other kinds 
of charges have been devised in recent times, limited only by new needs, 
inventiveness and success at meeting another type of test: the rational benefit nexus 
for incurred burden. This rational nexus test has become even more important as 
local governments have faced new needs to pay for the capital and service costs of 
growth starting in the 1970s and ‘80s by inventing many kinds of development 
impact fees (Nelson and Moody, 2003). Such fees can be successfully accumulated 
and used for future public improvements, beyond month-to-month or annual 
service, if the rational nexus between the charges and the needs for infrastructure 
investment generated by those who are charged (even though they are only part of 
the constituent population) is present. This ability to charge for prospective public 
goods will be important to the discussion here and represents the context for 
development of stormwater utility fees—a later development. We argue that 
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stormwater utility fees point to part of the future of climate adaptation financing as 
resiliency fees.  
Finally, local government borrowing for capital improvements such as 
infrastructure and other service facilities that can accrue revenue, such as stadiums 
and parks, allows for large expenditures to be paid for over time, given state legal 
enabling, a consenting public and a willing bond or loan market. Funds collected 
from taxation or fees can be used to amortize payments. Federal funds, such as 
those available through the State Revolving Funds (SRFs) and other state 
infrastructure finance banks mentioned earlier for water infrastructure, play a role 
in contributing to such projects but are limited in dollars and scope. Opportunities 
to use limited public funds to leverage additional bond investment from private 
markets is of intensifying interest, as already noted.  
5.1 Meeting the Rational Nexus Test with New Mechanisms 
Although the principle of uniform taxation or tax benefit equity has been stretched 
in practice, with both progressive and regressive effects, it has a strong practical 
influence on everything done in state and local finance. A test is needed to 
determine legitimate public benefit and equitable imposition of costs. 
Taking action to adapt to future risks or to address risk reduction that benefits 
some areas or groups more than others, and at different times, raises new challenges 
to funding. Deyle and Smith (2000) noted that the hazards research community has 
long made arguments that private decisions resulting in more risky locations of real 
property due to the environment should be taxed more to secure funds for the likely 
public costs of disaster response and recovery in the future (Burby et al., 1991). 
Deyle and Smith proposed a system of indices for a risk-based property assessment 
system for the future public burden generated by hurricane-vulnerable properties 
on Florida’s coast, but no such system has been devised.  
Benefit from taxes or fees that are imposed to adapt to future hazards of climate 
change may appear to violate the tax equity or rational nexus test. The acceptability 
of special benefit districts as a staple of local fiscal mechanisms still depends on 
this test. As Deyle and Smith (2000): 
The efficiency of a separate tax or fee for specific services depends 
on the ability to base the tax rate or fee structure on a measure of 
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differential consumption by individual beneficiaries. Special benefit 
taxes [sic or fees] accomplish this to varying degrees (2000: 425). 
The following example from recent research on public preferences for funding 
coastal adaptation illustrates that local tax and ratepayers’ perception of benefits is 
essential to acceptability of new schemes for adaptation finance. 
5.2 Public Preferences Reflect the Rational Nexus Test 
In an NSF-sponsored action research project on adaptation in Broward County/Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida, community leaders and engaged citizens participated in a 
series of workshops in which information on expected damages from sea level rise 
and storm surge through 2060 was analyzed for two heavily urbanized coastal parts 
of the area (Merrill et. al., In Submission, 2016). The participants in 2014-2015 
were engaged in choosing specifications for two alternative adaptation schemes—
phased property buyouts versus elevation of properties for selected areas—and 
benefit-cost analyses were conducted for the avoided damages to be realized from 
each action versus the investments required.  
Participants were asked about relative preferences for different types of local 
fiscal mechanisms to pay for such long-term adaptation actions. Table 1 (next page) 
shows a revealing pattern of rankings in the choices: general charging of the 
community for infrastructure and built environment adaptation—by general 
taxation means—is least preferred.  
Respondents were unlikely to support paying for a risk that someone else has but 
the respondents do not—i.e., coastal versus inland properties. There were two most-
frequently preferred fiscal approaches. One is to use mechanisms like the benefit-
assessment district, where a line is drawn around those who will benefit from the 
expenditures to be made and who will then pay for it. The second is helping to 
leverage private investment through underwriting loan access for adaptation. (Note 
that this study did not specify the source of the underwriting).  
The long-standing benefit district mechanism satisfies the equal taxation issue 
because it is based on what the courts have defined as the rational nexus between 
benefit and charge. But the jurisdiction-wide fees for stormwater management, for 
example, are a small but significant departure from and expansion of the acceptable 
definition of that rational nexus for funding responses to broad environmental 
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problems—like, potentially, climate change. In the middle with mixed acceptance 
in Table 1 are options for long-term amortization of investments in the future—
bonding and loans. (Methods of funding both forms of borrowing—public and 
subsidized private—were left open). This result is cause for optimism because, as 
mentioned earlier, adaptation will require present spending for actions that should 
be amortized in the long-term. 
The preferences that align with the rational benefits criterion proved very stable 
in this case: for example, as Table 2 (next page) shows, when participant rankings 
were grouped by their stated political affiliations, Republicans gave the lowest 
average numerical-equivalent scores for every choice, whereas Democrats gave the 
highest and Independents fell between the two extremes. However, the first and 
second ranked choices were the same across Republicans, Democrats and 
Independents, despite some variation among lower rankings. But what will the 
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Table 1. Comparative Acceptability of Funding Mechanisms for Local Adaptation Action 
(n=48) (Project Metropole, 2015) 
Table 2. Political Affiliation versus Funding Mechanism Ratings of Acceptability (rank 
order) (n=46) (Project Metropole, 2016) 






Property Tax-Based Fund 2.50 (3) 3.33 (4) 3.00 (3) 
Special District Assessment 2.17 (4) 3.67 (3) 3.56 (1) 
Long-Term Bonding 3.00 (2) 3.71 (2) 3.13 (2) 
Low-Interest Loans for Elevation or Flood-
proofing 
3.17 (1) 4.08 (1) 3.56 (1) 
Flood Resilience Surcharge on Water Bills 2.17 (4) 3.29 (5) 2.31 (4) 
Raise Local Sales Tax $ .005 to $.01 2.17 (4) 2.79 (6) 2.31 (4) 
 
FUNDING METHODs 



















Create a new county-wide 
resiliency fund based on 
property taxes 
18.8 12.5 31.3 16.7 20.8 3.08, 1.4   4 
Develop a special district 
assessment (on) properties 
in areas designated highly 
vulnerable 
10.4 12.5 29.2 18.8 29.2 3.48, 1.3   2 
Issue a bond (long-term 
borrowing) to finance public 
infrastructure improvements 
8.3 25.0 20.8 14.6 31.3 3.35, 1.4   3 
Create a low-interest loan 
program for flood proofing 
and elevating residences 
4.2 10.4 20.8 35.4 29.1 3.75, 1.1   1  
Add a flood resiliency 
surcharge on monthly water 
utility bill (ex: specific to 
storm water drain 
improvements) 
31.2 20.8 10.4 16.7 20.8 2.75, 1.6   5 
Raise the local sales tax 
slightly (options under the 
law <in FL> are either ½ cent 
or 1 cent per dollar) 
33.3 22.9 18.8 10.4 14.6 2.50, 1.4   6 
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6. DESIGNING LOCAL PROJECTS THAT INTEGRATE 
REVENUE GENERATION AND BENEFITS 
Innovation with existing local fiscal tools, leveraging and mixing of public and 
private resources and creation of co-benefits are all elements of robust approaches 
that are emerging at the local project level with state and other non-governmental 
organization support to address the gap that federal funding alone cannot fill. 
Among other things, these projects generate multiple benefits that can also create 
revenue opportunities to support innovative infrastructure solutions. Projects must 
also meet the tests of fiscal rationality for tax and ratepayers and will depend on 
creative project design at the local and regional levels. Here are four examples of 
emerging approaches. 
6.1 Miami Seawall and the re:focus Partners/Rockefeller re:invest Initiative  
Miami/Dade County Florida has devised innovative mechanisms to create value 
from adaptation by building on local fiscal mechanisms in new ways. The project 
is one of nine local demonstration projects supported by the Rockefeller Foundation 
with oversight by re:focus Partners LLC in an infrastructure development approach 
called the re:invest Initiative (re:focus Partners, 2015b). The re:invest initiative—
an eighteen-month experiment in re-imagining infrastructure projects using a new 
predevelopment process with the nine cities—aimed to generate: 
[...]projects made possible using a new framework for reimagining 
civic infrastructure systems to create both public value and private 
investment opportunities, especially for vulnerable communities. 
(re:focus Partners, 2015b: 3) 
“Predevelopment” demonstrations in Miami and eight other cities resulted from 
a competitive recruitment of the participating localities and systematic 
implementation of holistic design of resilient infrastructure solutions that 
innovatively integrate engineering with finance solutions, short- and longer-term 
steps (much like those pioneered by the United Kingdom in its resilience plan for 
the River Thames) and a mix of public and private roles and benefits. This is termed 
a “new predevelopment approach” to infrastructure replacement and innovation 
(re:focus Partners, 2015b). All its details including principles and specific project 
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feasibility analyses and alternatives are beyond the scope of this article but are 
illustrated using two project examples in Miami, FL and Hoboken, NJ. 
The Miami area’s 63-miles of legacy seawall is largely owned by private 
individuals. It is unevenly maintained and has gaps in coverage. Some property 
owners along the seawall face increasing losses due coastal storms and sea level 
rise, in addition to skyrocketing flood insurance costs (re:focus Partners, 2015c). 
On the engineering side, the long-term proposal is to build a seaward skirt-wall on 
the flawed existing structures, thus protecting and increasing the value of the 
considerable and increasingly vulnerable property behind it. On the finance side, 
the initiative has explored redesigning the catastrophe bond and/or pooling public-
private funds, both of which revolve around recouping value by reducing risks and 
avoiding losses in well-planned projects. One way to understand the recapture of 
value from risk reduction is to view the increased protection of properties as part of 
a new type of broad tax increment financing (TIF) district in which the increased 
tax base due to redevelopment/development of protected lands could be used to 
amortize the hazard mitigation efforts. Theoretically, the re:invest initiative would 
expand the scope of both TIF districts and special assessment districts to cover 
capital as well as O&M costs for such projects.  
This is a summary of the complex ideas in the Miami city report which readers 
should study for detail. The value-recapture proposals discussed in this section must 
analyze expected costs of no-action versus avoided losses and new value as a 
benefit and how that benefit will be accrued to public and private actors.  
Although the re:invest framework argues for “large-scale infrastructure”, the 
initiative also maintains that localities should pursue portfolios of multiple projects 
“at scale”. In other words, they should tailor integrated projects to local benefit and 
revenue opportunities of all sizes and pursue these efforts as part of an ongoing 
strategy rather than just specific projects (re:focus Partners, 2015b). There are three 
more examples that illustrate the potential role of distributed, smart project design. 
Two are driven by private foundation seed funding for the project ideas and design, 
in Hoboken, NJ and Hampton, VA, and the third is part of a community-wide, long-
term strategy in Lancaster, PA.  
6.2 Scaling Adaptation to Local Opportunities: Hoboken 
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Hoboken is a dense, urban area with an extensive 100-year floodplain, much of 
which was under six feet of water during Hurricane Sandy. Coupled with combined 
sewer overflow (CSO) problems, even small events pose serious pollution control 
and flood hazard problems. The State of New Jersey was awarded substantial funds 
as part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s post-Sandy 
recovery funding competition “Rebuild by Design”, Hoboken being one of three 
target cities. Hoboken also won involvement in the Rockefeller-funded re:invest 
innovative design project with re:focus partners LLC (re:focus partners, 2015d). 
One of the re:invest projects in predevelopment is a combined facility that 
incorporates an excess rainfall vault underneath a parking garage. The garage will 
be topped by a four-acre green infrastructure roof that will provide open space as 
well as additional permeable water storage facilities. The vault under the six-acre 
redevelopment site will drain storm sewer overflow from a large 50-acre drainage 
area called a contributory area. This will both reduce flood hazard in a subarea of 
downtown and relieve pressure on the sewerage system during large events by 
pumping nearly 1.5 million gallons of water back to the hard infrastructure system 
when it can be accommodated. The feasibility study for this proposal examines 
storage combinations combined with 1, 2, 3 and 4-level commercial parking 
garages in comparison to the costs and benefits of either a conventional 4-level 
parking-only garage (with the maximum 1,200 parking spaces) or a stormwater-
retention-only facility, as well as different 1- to 10-year storm loads and expected 
performance.  
For Hoboken, a dense, growing city already stressed for parking as well as 
hazard vulnerability, both the public and private sectors would accrue the integrated 
benefits of the combination of a parking facility and stormwater management. On 
the public side, stress would be relieved on the combined sewer system (also 
lessening incidences of regulatory issues with state and federal agencies), new 
urban outdoor recreation space would be created and a key area of downtown would 
increase in resilience with economic as well as safety value. On the private side, 
the project improves the attractiveness of a significant downtown area for new 
investment and consumption. On the financing side, possible models for this project 
include city ownership and operation with parking revenues supporting the facility 
or a public-private partnership for construction and operation under a long-term 
agreement, also based on parking revenues.  
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The alignment between such innovative, project-level public-private partnering 
designs and existing funding sources will need to be explored and the scope of key 
funding sources likely clarified and expanded. The New Jersey communities slated 
for the USHUD Rebuild by Design post-Sandy disaster recovery investment have 
significant resources available to them, including the New Jersey Environmental 
Infrastructure Trust (NJEIT), providing investment loans for water resource needs. 
The first of its kind in 1986, the NJEIT represents an institutional resource that can 
help finance adaptation, but not necessarily in projects like those mentioned above. 
The NJEIT Finance Program underwrites the NJ Clean Water State Revolving Fund 
and other financing streams aimed at local government and regional authority (e.g. 
ports, public utilities) water resource project needs including water supply, 
wastewater and conventional hard storm sewerage systems. Loans reduce 
borrowing costs to those public entities by twenty-five percent (over 20 years) to 
up to fifty percent over 40 years, as well as providing support for IRS and SEC 
procedures that reduces local consultant and legal costs (Zimmer, n.d.). The 
re:focus report on Hoboken mentions this and a variety of other possible funding 
sources, but not a definitive funding plan as of this writing. 
As argued here, successful use of innovative lending mechanisms will depend 
on smart project design integrating engineering solutions with finance and benefits 
at a local level. Two further examples from outside the Rockefeller programs 
demonstrate this. 
6.3 Creating Co-Benefits through Local Opportunities: Lancaster, PA 
The City of Lancaster is in the Chesapeake Bay watershed via the Conestoga River. 
With forty-five percent of its area in combined sewers subject to overflow and 
illegal discharge, and forty-eight percent impervious surfaces, the city has been 
involved since 1998 in trying to meet Clean Water Act and other Bay requirements 
(such as a sixty percent reduction in TMDLs by 2017) under a 1998 compliance 
plan. However, the continued high cost and limitations of controlling the 
stormwater pollution and flooding problems with gray (hard) infrastructure alone 
and the option of undertaking new integrated water resource planning with EPA 
and state regulators led the city to change direction. In 2010, Lancaster adopted a 
Green Infrastructure Plan with regulatory approval that aims to achieve what would 
cost $300 million in gray infrastructure construction and few other benefits with, 
instead, an integrated approach to their urban infrastructure that captures significant 
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stormwater volumes while providing many additional benefits. The plan identifies 
$140 million in green infrastructure opportunities for all capital projects including 
city streets, parking lots, public parks and green roofs that will match the 
performance of the previously planned $300 million in hard drainage. 
While not an innovative fiscal mechanism, this integrated approach is a national 
model for a citywide strategy that maximizes economic co-benefits not project-by-
project, but on a long-term and jurisdiction-wide scale—a major change.  
An example from the dozens of projects completed to date is the reconstruction 
of the intersection at Plum and Walnut streets. This location, a gateway to 
downtown with a major building on the Historic Register recently converted to a 
signature business—the Lancaster Brewing Company—was also an area of high 
storm runoff into the city sewer system contributing to overflows in violation of 
requirements under the Clean Water Act and the Chesapeake Bay compliance 
agreements. The intersection also had the highest accident rate in the city where 
one-way and two-way streets meet. Lancaster is integrating a Complete Streets 
approach to their urban transportation improvements with green infrastructure for 
water hazard management. The result has been a fall in accidents, a multi-modal 
area of the city complementing the redevelopment tasking place and the capture of 
2 million gallons per year of runoff. The five funding sources used are essentially 
conventional public mechanisms but combined in new ways including 
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation funds that would traditionally focus 
mainly on a conventional road improvement design (from the Pennsylvania 
Infrastructure Bank) and the integrated drainage system funded by a green 
infrastructure grant program from PENNVEST.  
The Plum & Walnut project won multiple state and NGO awards in 2014. A 
2014 EPA analysis recognizes the citywide effort as a model for future integrated 
approaches. It estimates that if fully implemented the strategy will save $660,000 
in reduced wastewater management costs, avoid $120 million in avoided gray 
infrastructure construction and produce an estimated $4 million in annual energy, 
air quality and climate-related benefits, for about $120 million in green 
infrastructure over time (Katzenmoyer, 2015). The city has also relied on the 
assistance of PENNVEST, that state’s version of the infrastructure banks in many 
cases being built on but extending beyond the long-time SRF program under the 
Clean Water Act. PENNVEST provided the green infrastructure funding, and is 
also noteworthy for extending credit to nontraditional borrowers and for managing 
24
Journal of Ocean and Coastal Economics, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://cbe.miis.edu/joce/vol3/iss2/4
DOI: 10.15351/2373-8456.1066
Pennsylvania’s nascent nutrient trading market—necessary finance organization 
infrastructure to realize private involvement, as discussed at the 2016 
Environmental Finance Forum cited earlier.  
6.4 Generating Private Revenue for Adaptation: Hampton Gardens, VA 
Finally, The Hampton Gardens initiative further demonstrates that the 
opportunistic, context-sensitive design approach to projects is at the heart of 
integrating adaptive solutions and creative financing on modest as well as larger 
scales. The Stormwater Alternatives through Green Enhancement (SAGE) program 
in the tidewater city of Hampton was created to offset the high cost of stormwater 
infrastructure projects using an innovative public/private partnership model. (The 
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, 2013) 
The city, in partnership with the University of Maryland EFC and two 
consulting firms, under a grant from the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation 
(NFWF), has taken up the practice among some Virginia cities of maintaining 
public beautification gardens along key roadways and added stormwater 
management. Such gardens lack the subsurface water drainage (such as cobble 
vaults and gradual-release mechanisms) that would allow them to capture excess 
rainfall in volumes significant enough to reduce nutrient pollution as well as 
localized flooding. Creating such systems is straightforward but requires capital 
investment. 
A program in Lynchburg, VA has been successful in creating gardens for 
beautification only with business support for philanthropic and business advertising 
reasons. In Hampton, the model designed is aimed at combining a new city 
stormwater fee which businesses will be paying with a new stormwater banking 
market that will allow contributions to be made to offset costs of new development 
by reducing fees. Selling advertising through sponsorship is also an option in the 
approach. While facing many challenges in early stages, the National Fish and 
Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) is funding this pilot to extend it throughout 
Chesapeake Bay (NFWF, 2016). 
7. CONCLUSIONS, RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
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While the focus of examples here has been on adaptation mainly regarding the 
problem of more uncertainty about water as hazard (i.e., stormwater—a major 
aspect of climate change for some regions) and due to sea level rise, the general 
issues and principles discussed all apply to other arenas for adaptation and 
resiliency such as energy, urban heat extremes and public health, to name a few. 
Many propositions are emerging from operational lessons about how to approach 
adaptation finance challenges that point to the need to bridge the distinction 
between public and private goods and fiscal mechanisms in creative ways and at 
multiple levels: 
 Some existing local and state fiscal tools can be extended and 
combined in new ways to support adaptation and they can widen 
in purposes but still meet the necessary test of a rational nexus 
between burdens and benefits. The use of stormwater utilities is 
a case in point examined here. Existing mechanisms for drawing 
local benefit districts and perhaps tax increment financing 
districts may be others. 
 Public funds, insufficient to meet needs, can be more actively 
used to leverage private participation through packaging of 
finance strategies and especially through using underwriting of 
preferential private borrowing for resilience to increase 
distributed adaptation by households and firms that 
complements larger-scale public projects. 
 Packaging and leveraging require creative and opportunistic 
project design and thinking of both the solutions and the 
resource or revenue generation options from the earliest stages, 
especially regarding the co-benefits that can be created, contrary 
to much traditional public works and public finance practice. 
This emphasis on pre-development invention and choices is 
receiving growing attention. 
 The local government level is where much invention and 
innovation will take place with flexible collaboration of state 
and federal levels, and such flexibility is essential to attracting 
private financial and organizational participation 
 State governments have a key role to play in enabling and 
facilitating local as well as state level actions in financial 
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markets as well as in promoting coordination and providing 
technical support for local government level effort. 
More research is needed on emerging models such as those briefly covered 
herein. The work by re:focus Partners LLC under Rockefeller sponsorship is 
important for bringing to the fore innovations that their group is helping invent, but 
discussion and dissemination of these initiatives is still very limited. The 
characteristics of smart project design at the pre-development stage, as briefly 
illustrated here, need more investigation as to their economic benefits and fiscal 
sustainability. Most of the emerging ideas and lessons are largely only documented 
and disseminated in gray literature, foundation-generated reports among 
specialized audiences and in some industry circles. More investigation is needed on 
how inventive strategies can be combined with existing state authorities and local 
practices, as well as with the financial industry and federal regulators, as the 
experience with energy finance innovation has illustrated. Best practices across 
states need to be analyzed, as well as needed legal and organizational changes at 
federal and state levels. For example, in 2016 the U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
decision to expand safe harbors for funds in public-private utility partnerships has 
addressed a long-standing issue known by the financial industry, states and some 
local specialists. Wading through the understanding of what is needed within state 
as well as federal institutions is difficult given the lack of consolidated, comparative 
analysis. Adaptation finance forums that bring public and private sectors together, 
like those held by the Environmental Finance Centers in the last few years, are 
needed within regions and states to bring together the multiple actors as a source of 
comparative and detailed knowledge and to identify practical questions that need 
to be answered.  
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